The nature of compassion Whether compassion can be taught depends in part on what we take it to be. In defining compassion, it is important not to confuse it with related but different moral qualities. Like compassion, pity can be aroused by suffering, but may contain condescension and interpersonal distance absent in compassion. Benevolence and altruism carry much broader meanings than compassion and aren't focused on suffering. Concern for suffering in compassion is sometimes confused with concern for socialjustice, but these two qualities are logically and psychologically distinct. Compassion is characteristically focused on a particular person or situation, whereas concern for social justice may be very abstract, legalistic, and not involve any particular situation. Social justice characteristically involves problems ofequality among humans, whereas compassion is not paradigmatically concerned with these problems and may even be focused on animals.
Imagination plays a key role in compassion in achieving understanding of, and feeling for, suffering people. This imagination involves self-transposal into another's situation. However, it is not enough merely to transpose one's own views unto the sufferer because 'selves' and personalities differ. The imagination then of ideal compassion is more than imaginative self-transposal, more than the Golden Rule of putting oneself in another's place. A richer, more powerful imagination is needed to understand and feel the suffering of people of different backgrounds, values, and needs. Because of this gap between people, obtaining the imaginative understanding of suffering can at times be a worthy achievement like other medical achievements.
Part of the reason why this imaginative understanding is an achievement (and also why compassion differs from concern for social justice) is that this understanding presupposes an intimacy between people through which the sufferer reveals personal details to the listener. Such expressing deep concern for human welfare could be brought, by an authority figure in a relatively innocuous situation, to deliver potentially lethal shocks to innocent people (50 per cent in one experiment never stopped shocking their 'victims' at all, never disobeyed, continuously delivering 440+ volts). The power of medical school is enormously more powerful than Milgram's lab in shaping behaviour, as are the penalties of disobedience. These findings can be extrapolated to medical environments: moral virtues like idealism, conscience, and inchoate compassion can easily be snuffed out by contradictory environments. Expectations and penalties of specific medical systems, rather than an individual's prior traits, best predict future behaviour.
For this reason, I believe the lay public and some admissions committees are mistaken in believing that selection of better 'input' to medical systems will produce more compassionate physicians. Compassion in undergraduates is notoriously difficult to discover or measure, especially in the brief, episodic encounters of mass education between professor and student where possible future requests for recommendations may lurk in a student's mind. But even ifcompassion could be accurately identified in undergraduates, the crucial problem remains of the great power of medical education to eradicate compassion.
Changing the system to teach compassion
The critical question which remains is how existing systems, which do not in reality reward compassion, might be changed so as at least not to undermine existing compassion in students and perhaps actively to support it.
The prior discussion of compassion argued that trust and intimacy are required for compassion to flourish. This implies two things are needed to support compassion: first, flexibility in the time-demands of students to allow them to pursue particular cases in which they become involved; second, systematic acceptance by medical teachers that such activities and the moral Focus: Can compassion be taught? 191 qualities they develop are worth encouraging.
Standard objections to these two requirements do not carry much weight. Some object that the student who 'holds a patient's hand' is not really as compassionate as he who forsakes the patient for the lab to develop a cure for the patient's disease. But, of course, many of the medical problems causing suffering today (for example, neoplasms, stroke, and kidney failure) are unlikely to be cured by a few hours in the lab, much less by beginning students. Compassion is often needed in precisely those medical conditions which are chronic, sometimes perhaps caused by unhealthy lifestyles, and for which the laboratory-orientated 'germ model' of disease seems inappropriate. Since medicine prides itself on adjusting treatment to changing knowledge of empirical facts, perhaps it is time to emphasise -constantly -to students that scientific medicine and compassion are not mutually exclusive.
In facing these facts and problems, great temptation exists to ignore the present thesis and to pursue mistaken solutions. The problem of how to teach compassion will not be solved by falling victim to the disease of Let's-Set-Up-A-Committee, nor will it be solved if compassion becomes a hot topic of after-dinner talks. Nor will the problem be solved in the way that some hospitals in the twentieth century have attempted to solve the social, financial, and familial problems of patients: by setting up a Department of Compassion. This device will only create a new bureaucracy and a new professional to attempt to solve a problem which (in truth) can only be solved between physicians, medical students, and patients. Historically, problems of compassion have come to be seen as problems of social workers, psychologists, hospital clergy, patient representatives, and (sometimes) psychiatrists. As a result, problems of compassion are increasingly seen not as the problems ofminimally competent physicians but as problems of 'other' people.
It should be obvious then that the problem of teaching compassion is not going to be solved either by first and second-year courses in Human Values or Ethics. Although such courses are important in sustaining existing compassion in pre-clinical years by developing imaginative understanding through films, casestudies, and literature, their effects will almost certainly be destroyed if not reinforced by the crucially powerful settings ofthe subsequent years.
Making such changes is perhaps not as difficult as some might think, and the price of not making any changes is to give up the ideal of compassion in medicine (5) . Important and profound changes in medical education can be made, given the will to do so by powerful professors therein. Compassion can indeed be taught if systems of medical education reward this virtue alongside other medical virtues such as diagnostic skill and factual command, but merely to rely on the efforts of a few individuals to transmit compassionhowever prestigious and tireless they may be -is to forsake compassion as a characteristic excellence of medical graduates. Without such systems to nurture it, compassion in any particular graduate remains a 'gift of the gods'. (6) .
